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Abstract 
This paper adopts a regional and geographical approach to 
show how the early spread of communism to mainland South- 
east Asia owes much to overseas Chinese and overland Viet- 
namese patterns of immigration. This wider approach seeks to 
get beyond the frontiers of nationalist histories and the for- 
mation of the 'modern' nation-state (whether colonial or natio- 
nal) in order to think in more material terms about how com- 
munism not entirely unlike Catholicism or any other religion 
first entered mainland Southeast Asia on the ground, by which 
channels, by which groups of people and at which times. The 
idea is to begin mapping out the introduction and spread of 
communism in peninsular Southeast Asia in both time and 
space. This, in turn, provides us with a methodologically and 
historically sounder basis for thinking about the 'why' of this 
Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary graft and the failure of this 
brand of communism to take hold in certain places and among 
certain peoples outside of China and Vietnam. 
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Introduction 
It is well known that in the 17th century French missionaries 
established their Asian religious headquarters and seminary in 
Ayuthia in a bid to spread Catholicism eastwards to Vietnam 
and China. It is also now known that when it came to conver- 
ting the various Buddhist kingdoms of the peninsula to Christi- 
anity, the results were anything but successful, whether among 
the masses down below or the kings ruling them from on high.' 
What is less known is that the early Asian intermediaries for the 
diffusion of Catholicism on the ground in the Buddhist king- 
doms of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and often in the ethnically 
diverse highlands were Vietnamese 6migr6s (known widely to- 
day as Viet kieu). Joining them were Japanese Christian refugees 
and overseas Chinese immigrants (Hua qiao), concentrated 
mainly in the ports of the South Seas (Nanyang) englobing much 
of what we call 'Southeast Asia' today.' Compared to the Viet- 
namese, there were very few ethnic Lao, Khmer or Thai con- 
verts to or missionaries of Catholi~ism.~ 
Over two centuries later, Western-derived communism, like 
Catholicism, would also enter the Buddhist lands of Cambodia 
and Laos through Vietnamese channels, and not via the ethnic 
Lao and Khmer majority populations. In the Kingdom of Thai- 
land, the introduction of radicalism would be shared by 
Chinese and Vietnamese communists working for the Comin- 
tern, the former relying on long-standing overseas Chinese com- 
munities in the port of Bangkok to spread the message, the 
latter preferring overland Vietnamese immigration routes run- 
ning across Laos to upper northeast Thailand. Working to- 
gether, in 1930 Chinese and Vietnamese internationalists led by 
Ho Chi Minh himself presided over formation of the Siamese 
and Malaya Communist Parties and a 'Laotian communist cell'. 
In the late 1940s, as the Chinese communist victory in China 
began to re-link Vietnamese communists to the world commu- 
nist movement with which they had lost touch since the late 
1930s, Vietnamese communists resurrected their prewar inter- 
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nationalist contract by creating separate Laotian and Cambo- 
dian revolutibnary parties as part of a larger 'Indochinese revo- 
lution', the 'front line' of revolution in Southeast Asia. 
My aim in this paper is not to compare Vietnamese Catholics 
and communists, whether inside or outside Vietnam. Although 
a provocative parallel, it is also a very misleading one? Nor am 
I suggesting that to be 'communist' or 'Catholic' in Asia, one 
had to be 'Confucian' or 'Sinicized'. This would be misleading, 
as the success of Christianity in the Philippines shows, the 
Indonesian and Indian Communist Parties demonstrate, and 
the terrible excesses of Cambodian radicalism have made pain- 
fully clear. Moreover, Western and Japanese colonialism was 
the major catalytic force pushing many Asian anticolonialists to 
choose communism as a way of liberating their nations. 
If I evoke the intermediary role Vietnamese immigrants 
played in the early propagation (truyen ba) of Catholicism and 
communism into the peninsula, my idea is simply to try to shift 
us into the regional currents of Vietnamese history and to get us 
thinking in less political and polemical terms and in more 
geographical and cultural ones about how Vietnamese inter- 
nationalists became-together with the Chinese-the major 
agents for the introduction and early spread of communism 
into peninsular Southeast Asia prior to the Second World War, 
the subject of this refle~tion.~ For if much has been written on 
the 'grafting' (ghip ciiy) of (international) Marxism-Leninism to 
the (national) 'stock' (thiin gbc) of Vietnamese patriotism," much 
less attention has been paid to how fervent Vietnamese 
internationalists served as the Asian intermediaries in the early 
spread of communism to Thailand, Laos and Cambodia be- 
tween 1925 and 1954.7 What interests me therefore is the 
analytical value of a 'regional approach' extending over a longer 
span of time,' one that allows us to get beyond the frontiers of 
nationalist histories and the formation of the 'modern' itat- 
nation (whether colonial or national) in order to think in more 
geographical and material terms about how communism-not 
entirely unlike Catholicism-first entered mainland Southeast 
Asia on the ground: by which channels, through which groups 
of people and at what times. 
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What I cannot consider here is the flipside of this ques- 
tion-that is, the why: Why did Vietnamese (and Chinese) 
apparently feel more at ease propagating communism into the 
ethnically and culturally diverse lands of peninsular Southeast 
Asia at the outset? Or why did communism have such a hard 
time recruiting non-Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries to 
the internationalist cause in Malaya, Laos, Cambodia and Thai- 
land before the Second World War? Knowing how the commu- 
nist message was first evangelized, in which languages or how 
it was indigenized or rejected by the local populations would 
undoubtedly throw new light on such matters. 
While I evoke some of these socio-cultural factors in my con- 
clusion, because of space limitations I concentrate in this paper 
on how Vietnamese revolutionaries became the leading Asian 
intermediaries for spreading communism into parts of the 
peninsula located just west of the Annamese Cordillera (Truong 
Son), my shorthand for the contemporary states of Laos, Cam- 
bodia, Thailand and Malaysia. My idea is to begin mapping out 
the introduction and spread of communism in peninsular 
Southeast Asia along the geographical and material lines men- 
tioned above. This will provide, I hope, a methodologically and 
historically sounder basis for a second, more socio-cultural 
essay on the why. 
In both cases, though, I think it is important to extend our 
analysis over a longer span of time than we are normally accus- 
tomed to do. For the how, it might even be worthwhile to return 
as far back as the so-called 'precolonial period' in order to con- 
sider how ancient patterns of Sino-Vietnamese immigration 
across the Indochinese peninsula just may have combined to 
inscribe the early introduction of communism to peninsular 
Southeast Asia and to the western half of French Indochina in 
particular. Paradoxically, if official historiography in Hanoi 
today plays up the 'reality' of the 'special relationships' (quan he 
dac biet) binding revolutionary Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia, 
Vietnamese communists have conveniently forgotten that at the 
outset peninsular communism was a very Sino-Vietnamese 
affair . . . 
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Nanyang: Between Southern China and Southeast 
Asia 
Overseas Chinese and Overland Vietnamese 
Immigration into the Nanyang 
Long before the 20th century, the nature of Chinese immi- 
gration to Southeast Asian port and coastal cities had always 
provided Chinese political refugees with bases from which they 
sought shelter, collected funds, regrouped and tried, when 
possible, to overthrow the ruling power on the mainland. Many 
of these political refugees stayed on to make important histo- 
rical contributions to local In Vietnam today, if the term 
Minh Huong is widely used to describe children of Sino- 
Vietnamese unions, it originally referred to southern Chinese 
kmigr6s who had remained 'loyal' (huong) to the overthrown 
Ming dynasty (Minh) .  On the run, the famous Mac family 
played a notable role in the economic, political and cultural 
development of the Ha Tien region, long before the ethnic Viet- 
namese got there. Similar things can be said for the Chinese in 
Thailand." 'Triad Societies' and 'Heaven and Earth Associ- 
ations' (Thien Dia Hoi) originally seeking to restore the Ming 
emerged from the 17th century in Taiwan and throughout most 
of the Nanyang. In the 19th century, these associations spread 
eastwards as more and more Chinese immigrants went to 
Hawaii and the American West coast. Even the Vietnamese 
King Tu Duc would turn to these secret societies for help as the 
French consolidated their hold on southern Vietnam." 
Later, following his expulsion from Japan in 1907, Sun Yat- 
sen would continue in this tradition by setting up branches of 
the Tongmenhui (TMH) among the Hua qiao living and working 
throughout Nanyang port cities, especially in Singapore, Malaya 
and Vietnam and often by winning over pre-existing secret 
societies.12 This link in ancient Chinese immigration between 
political dislocation in southern Chinese provinces and in- 
creased immigration to Southeast Asian port cities on the one 
hand and how it affected Southeast Asian states on the other is 
Christopher E. Goscha 
worth keeping in mind for revolutionary movements in the 
Nanyang into the 20th century.13 
Vietnamese immigration to Southeast Asia never matched 
these Chinese movements, neither in numbers, economic 
success, nor in geographical reach. Indeed, if one can truly 
speak of 'overseas' (hai duong) for the Chinese, in the case of 
'pre-colonial' Vietnam it i perhaps more accurate to speak of 
overland or coastal/rive 1 immigration, movements that were 
much more peninsular in their scope. Two major routes in 
particular linked the ancient Vietnamese Kingdoms of Tonltin 
(Dang Ngoai) and Cochinchina (Dang Trong) to western parts of 
the peninsula.14 An overland one had connected Cochinchina to 
Lao and Thai kingdoms since at least the 17th century, if not 
long before. Connecting the markets of Vinh and Nakhon 
Phanom, this trail shuttled goods, animals, people, tribute and 
no doubt a few ideas across the Annamese range. It was also 
one of the few land routes between the more Sinicized world of 
Tonkin and the more Indianized and Buddhist kingdoms lying 
across the Ai-Lao Pass. Because of war, famine, religious perse- 
cution or better economic opportunities in the Mekong region, 
several thousand Vietnamese were living in villages in upper 
northeast Thailand by the late 19th century. Many more joined 
them following the French military occupation of central and 
northern Vietnam. However, this land trail to the Mekong was 
largely a Vietnamese one; given that Chinese immigration 
remained largely maritime and therefore concentrated in Thai 
coastal and port cities.15 
To the south, coastal and Cambodian river routes had long 
brought ~ochinchinese traders, settlers and Christians into 
Cambodia and Thailand, where Vietnamese quarters (ban in 
Thai) already existed in the 17th century. These movements in 
the Gulf of Thailand were probably facilitated by the larger 
movements of the Chinese and their regional junk trade 
between Canton and Ayuthia. Vietnamese Catholic fishermen, 
in particular, continued settling along the coast of the Gulf of 
Thailand-in Chantaboun, Trat, the Bangkok area and even 
further north along central Thailand's canals. By the early part 
of the 20th century, there were between 20 and 30,000 Viet kieu 
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living in Thailand, concentrated in two major zones: 1) along 
the waterways stretching from the Gulf of Thailand inwards up 
the Chaophraya to Paknampho and Ban Dong and 2) in the 
present, upper northeastern Thai provinces of Sakhon Nakhon, 
Nakhon Phanom and Udon Thani, not far from the Vietnamese 
provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh (see Map). There were 
hardly any Lao, Khmer or Thai going abroad to study Catholi- 
cism in Macao, Penang or Rome.16 
Chinese and Vietnamese Revolutionary 
Immigration along Traditional Lines 
Knowing the geography of these overseas Chinese and over- 
land Vietnamese colonies in Southeast Asia is helpful, for once 
the French colonized Indochina, Vietnamese anticolonialists 
turned to these overseas communities for shelter, funds and 
external bases for retaking Vietnam from the outside, with Gia 
Long's reliance on southeastern Thailand in the 18th century 
cited as a model to follow by early anticolonialists. This was 
even more the case for Prince Cuong De, a direct descendant of 
Gia Long opposed to the French, and Phan Boi Chau, another 
patriotic Vietnamese hero.17 Together, these two ran the famous 
Dong Du (Voyage to the East) movement in Japan to train 
students in military arts and study Western modernization via 
a successful Asian importer. They were not alone: so too did 
Indian, Thai, Korean and Chinese nationalists, above all Sun 
Yat-sen whom Chau first met in Japan. Of course, Tokyo's 
expulsion of Phan Boi Chau's Dong Du movement in 1909 
represented a major setback for Vietnamese anticolonialists, as 
it did for Sun. However, it simultaneously forced Phan Boi 
Chau to look to southern China and Thailand, in what would 
become a recurring strategic choice for Vietnamese circulating 
on the outside of Indochina over the next four decades.'' 
Given the troubled state of southern Chinese politics at the 
time, Phan Boi Chau moved the bulk of the Dong Du's students 
to Thailand, thanks to the tacit support of the Thai court, the 
chance to set up  another 'quarter' near Ban Dong in central 
Thailand and the large Viet kieu populations there. As in the 
past, the direct descendant of Gia Long, Prince Cuong De, 
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turned to the Thai court when it came to getting his family's 
throne back. But Phan Boi Chau may have chosen Thailand for 
three other reasons. First, he probably wanted to exploit his 
TMH regional contacts and Sun Yat-sen's shift to the Nanyang 
Chinese since early 1906, when Sun had created TMH branches 
in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. In 1908, a General 
Bureau in Singapore came to life in charge of all the Nanyang 
branches.19 Second, Singapore was a key point in the TMH's 
arms trafficking in the Nanyang. Chau and his lieutenants went 
to Singapore to meet ranking TMH leaders (Chen Shunan) and 
Chinese arms dealers in 1908-09. Third, impressed by the bases 
and financial donations afforded to the TMH by the Hua qiao, 
Phan Boi Chau must have at least dreamed of doing the same in 
Thailand via the Viet kieu. He certainly cited overseas Hindu 
and Korean patriotic immigrant organizations in Asia as 
models for the Viet kieu to follow in Thailanda2' 
Nevertheless, compared to Sun Yat-sen, Phan Boi Chau's 
success rate was much more limited. With the French in control 
of western Indochina, Chau only had the Viet kieu in Thailand 
at his potential disposal. Moreover, the Vietnamese in Thailand 
could hardly match the donations of much richer Chinese in the 
Nanyang. And often they wanted nothing to do with 'revolu- 
tion', happy to integrate peacefully into Thai society or remain 
faithful to their Christian traditions (see below). The large Viet- 
namese populations could, however, provide shelter close to 
Vietnam yet safe from direct French repression. With a blind 
eye from Thai authorities keen on one day getting parts of 
western Indochina back, Dong Du disciples set up revolutionary 
organizations in the Bangkok-Ayuthia area, in Phichit province 
and eventually in the Mekong provinces of Nalchon Phanom, 
Nong Khai and Udon Thani. Following Sun Yat-sen's victory in 
southern China in 1911 and formation of the Guomindang 
(GMD), Vietnamese revolutionaries would once again shift 
their headquarters back to the north, to Canton, but always kept 
in touch with their Thai operations. 
What is important for our purposes here is that by the early 
1920s, the inheritors of the Dong Du movement had established 
themselves firmly among the Vietnamese in upper northeast 
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Thailandt2' just out of the direct reach of the French SQretd, but 
connected to central Vietnam by the overland route described 
above. Anticolonialists led by Dang Thuc Hua made Udon 
Thani their headquarters rather than Ban Dong, reflecting a 
notable shift in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement from 
its former maritime tack to this overland route linking upper 
northeast Thailand to central Vietnam by way of Laos. If Phan 
Boi Chau had smuggled a couple of hundred young Viet- 
namese to Japan by way of the port of Hong Kong, one of the 
major routes for sending students to southern China now ran 
from central Vietnam to Udon Thani, Ban Dong and then on to 
Bangkok and Canton. Yet older ties remained intact: Phan Boi 
~ h a u ' s  son-in-law was the main guide for bringing students out 
of Vietnam to the Mekong. 
This change in tack in the Vietnamese revolutionary organi- 
zation in Asia is important, for it helps to explain why some of 
the most important Vietnamese communists started their revo- 
lutionary training in northeast Thailand before moving on to 
the Youth League, the Whampoa Military Academy, the Com- 
intern or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in southern 
China. I am thinking of Pham Hong Thai, Le Hong Phong, Le 
Hong Son, Hoang Van Hoan and General Hoang Sam. Viet- 
namese youngsters who followed this upper Indochinese route 
rarely went to France. This is also an important distinction, 
becabse a number of these Asian-trained ~ietnamese militants 
would play the key role in forming a Cambodian and above all 
a Laotian revolutionary party after the Second World War (see 
below) .22 
But let us remain in 1925 for the moment, for the work of 
these early anticolonialists and their organizational presence 
among the Viet kieu in upper northeast Thailand in particular 
helps us to understand a little better how Western-derived radi- 
calism would first flow from Canton into Thailand and Laos via 
these overseas Chinese and overland Vietnamese channels. This 
occurred between 1927 and 1930, when political trouble broke 
out in southern China and the cornintern began to promote an 
internationalist line, calling for communist parties in all of Asia 
to promote proletarian revolution. 
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The Sino-Vietnamese Nature of 
Early Nanyang Communism 
The Comintern and Converging Sino-Vietnamese 
Revolutionary Movements 
If Western-derived Catholicism arrived in force in East Asia via 
the maritime routes opened by the Portuguese in the 16th cen- 
turyIz3 Soviet-backed communism made its strongest appear- 
ance by way of China-southern China, above all the ports of 
Canton and Shanghai.24 After all, the CCP had been formed in 
Shanghai in 1921 and the GMD's power-base had long been a 
southern Chinese-Nanyang affair. The triple entente between 
the GMD, the CCP and the Soviets therefore greatly enhanced 
the importance of Canton and Shanghai as key Asian revolu- 
tionary ports from 1924-25. It was thus not entirely an accident 
that Nguyen Ai Quoc (the future Ho Chi Minh) arrived in 
Canton from Moscow in late 1924 to work for the Soviet colonel 
Borodin and to form the famous Vietnamese Revolutionary 
Youth League around a year later. And he was not the only 
Asian communist landing there or working for Borodin. 
Yet Ho was not of the Dong Du school. When he left Vietnam 
in 1911, he had first travelled to the West via the Suez Canal. In 
France, he took a reformist shot at the Ecole Coloniale. Rejected, 
he converted to communism, convinced that it was the only 
way left to win back Vietnam's independence. By making this 
choice, however, Quoc also entered an international revolution- 
ary movement parallel to the colonial one he had just left that 
sent him back to Asia by way of Moscow and began to link his 
embryonic revolutionary movement to a larger communist 
world led by the Soviet Union. Again, he was not the only 
Asian making such a choice. Many Chinese students in France 
were making similar decisions: Li Lisan became head of the 
CCP in Shanghai after living in France and Chen Yannian 
formed the French branch of the CCP before returning to Can- 
ton in early 1925 (where he was also allegedly on good terms 
with Borodin). The formation of Quoc's Canton mission must 
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therefore be placed in the wider context of the Comintern's 
China policy, the complex regional alliance between the CCP 
and the GMD at this time in Cantonz, long-standing Sino- 
Vietnamese anticolonial contacts throughout the Nanyang, and 
the possibility of another level of French revolutionary connec- 
tions linking Nguyen Ai Quoc to Chinese communists, many of 
whom also returned to southern China around 1925 by way of 
Moscow, such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yannian. 
Canton also offered Nguyen Ai Quoc the chance to graft his 
Youth League on to the Dong Du's revolutionary networks 
already running between southern China and northeast Thai- 
land and to take advantage of increased Vietnamese immigra- 
tion into southern China via French concessions and the 
Yunnan railway." In fact, Quoc was not quite a total stranger to 
the Dong Du's Asian organizations, thanks to family ties and 
long-standing friendships linking Viet kieu families in Canton 
and northeastern Thailand to his natal province in upper cen- 
tral Vietnam (via his sister for example). Relying on the prestige 
of Dang Thuc Hua among the Vietnamese in northeastern Thai- 
land and Ho Hoc Lam among the Viet kieu and GMD circles in 
Canton, Quoc was able to take over the best of the Dong Du's 
bases and family connections in favour of the Youth Leag~e. '~  
On that note, combining the southern Chinese provinces of 
Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong and the Dong Du routes and 
bases in the Nanyang into a wider regional analysis of Viet- 
namese revolutionary activities might shed some new light on 
why Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary movements were 
already intersecting in Canton when Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived 
there.28 Viewed from this regional angle, the strong revolution- 
ary overlap between Nguyen Ai Quoc's Youth League and the 
GMD's Whampoa Military Academy (Truong Quan-Chinh 
Hoang Pho) in Canton is perhaps easier to grasp. After all, more 
than 300 Vietnamese youths were trained in Canton between 
1925 and 1927, as students in the Whampoa Military Academy, 
members of the CCP and/or founders of the Vietnamese Youth 
League. Most of these young Vietnamese came from central and 
northern Vietnam, northeast Thailand, but rarely from Cochin- 
china." Besides hearing lectures from Nguyen Ai Quoc and 
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Colonel Borodin, these budding Vietnamese revolutionaries 
also listened to ranking CCP leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Liu 
Shaoqi, Li Fuchan, Chen Yannian and Peng Pai. Even Nguyen 
Ai Quoc 'participated in' and 'executed loyally the orders' of the 
CCP between 1924 and 1927. And when Quoc was arrested in 
China in 1942 by the GMD, he was on his way to meet Zhou 
Enlai.% 
The best example of this southern Chinese revolutionary 
intersection in Vietnamese communism is to be found in a 
recently rehabilitated Vietnamese communist general named 
Nguyen Son. Introduced into Chinese revolutionary circles by 
Ho Chi Minh in 1925, Son joined the CCP and fought in the 
Canton Uprising in 1927. In 1934, he became a member of the 
CCP's Central Committee and actually made the Long March 
with Mao Zedong's troops. By the late 1930s, he had become a 
high-ranking officer in the Red Army and was counted among 
the CCP's political elite. Back in Vietnam in 1945, Nguyen Son 
took command of central Vietnamese fighting forces (LKIV), 
together with two other Vietnamese officers who had been 
trained in Chinese military schools, namely Generals Le Thiet 
Hung and Nguyen Binh. In 1948, Ho Chi Minh personally 
honoured Nguyen Son (in Chinese characters) as the 'talented 
general of two countries'. Indeed, he was3' 
If I digress briefly here, my point is to underscore the impor- 
tance of not letting recent problems in Sino-Vietnamese rela- 
tions and modern Asian boundaries blind us to the regional, 
transnational character of early Vietnamese communism and its 
movement within these southern Chinese channels, themselves 
a reflection of the southern tilt of Chinese communism. This is 
especially the case as we return to Southeast Asia/Nanyang 
along Sino-Vietnamese routes. For if southern China was the 
CCP's and Youth League's main base at this point, changes in 
southern Chinese politics were-as always-going to make 
themselves felt in the Nanyang. More than anything else, the 
violent break between the GMD and the CCP in April 1927 and 
the violence triggered by the failed Canton Uprising at the end 
of that year sent thousands of Chinese (mainly Hainanese) 
fleeing on junks and steamers to the Nanyang countries", where 
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many communist refugees began forming new and/or break- 
away CCP branches in opposition to the GMD's older organi- 
zations. In Singapore, Chinese radicals transformed the South 
Seas [Nanyang] Branch Committee of the CCP into the South 
Seas [Nanyang] Communist Party (SSCP), whose First Congress 
took place in 1927. Directed by CCP headquarters now in 
Shanghai, the SSCP was given permission 'to gradually expand 
its activities to all parts of the South Seas'.33 It was in this 
context that CCP members either pushed out of southern China 
or now in opposition to the GMD in the Nanyang region tried to 
form entirely independent CCP branches in Saigon and 
Bangkok in 1927 and 1928. What attracted them most was tap- 
ping into the pre-existing Hua qiao communities and especially 
the growing Chinese working classes concentrated in these 
urban centres. However, the success of Chinese communists in 
Saigon in the late 1920s was less than impressive, owing to the 
long-standing GMD presence there and tight European sur- 
veillance. It was only in September 1938, as the Sino-Japanese 
war expanded into southern China, that a CCP 'section' ap- 
peared in southern Vietnam.% 
Nguyen Ai Quoc was obviously aware of this Chinese exo- 
dus towards Southeast Asia from 1927, since he was smuggling 
his own students out of Canton and on to safe bases in north- 
east Thailand. Caught directly in the cross-fire of Chinese civil 
war, on 5 May 1927, Quoc left Canton for Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, and then on to Vladivostock, where a member of the 
French Communist Party (FCP) suggested that he eventually 
return to Thailand via Paris to rebuild the Vietnamese move- 
ment. Quoc agreed and returned to Moscow. In November 
1927, on instructions from the Comintern, he left for Paris. 
There, French communists helped him finalize his plans to 
rebuild the revolutionary movement in Indochina through the 
formation of an external base in Thailand.35 As for southern 
China, the Youth League was in shambles, as several compe- 
ting, non-communist Vietnamese 6migr6 groups gained increa- 
sed GMD backing in southern China against the communists.% 
Coinciding with this shift from southern China to the Nan- 
yang by Chinese and Vietnamese communists was the inter- 
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nationalization of the Asian communist movement by the 
Comintern. In May 1928, the 6th Congress of the Comintern 
was convened. With the GMD's attack on the CCP as well as 
internal political concerns in mind, Stalin ordered communists 
in colonial areas to abandon their alliances with bourgeois 
nationalist parties in favour of international proletarian revo- 
lution. The French claim that during his trip to Moscow, Quoc 
was instructed by the Executive Central Committee of the 3rd 
International to form a communist party for I n d ~ c h i n a . ~ ~  Before 
building a party, though, Comintern leaders had first to re- 
evaluate the state of their remaining Asian bases following the 
GMD's crackdown. It did not take them long to understand that 
Quoc would have to begin his work on Indochina's western 
flank, in northeast Thailand. 
Reinforcing Quoc's trip to Thailand was the presence among 
the Viet kieu in Thailand of a handful of his most trusted 
collaborators, trained by him in Canton and sent to Thailand 
following the Canton violence (Hoang Van Hoan comes to 
mind). Quoc arrived in Bangkok sometime in mid-1928. He 
then hurried to Ban Dong in Phichit province, the very one 
created by Phan Boi Chau's lieutenants. There, in an overseas 
Chinese shop, Quoc met with one of his most trusted students 
(also an in-law of Dang Thuc Hua). He then moved on to the 
main base in Udon Thani. During this time, he trained 
Vietnamese sent from Vietnam, transferred from Canton and 
recruited from among the Viet kieu. With Dang Thuc Hua's 
backing, Quoc took over the Dong Du's bases in Thailand by 
converting most of the Dang family to his revolutionary project 
and carefully keeping them in charge of the Thai bases. He 
went out of his way to win over the Viet kieu to the patriotic 
cause; for they were his stepping-stones leading back into Viet- 
nam. In 1928, Quoc transferred his Youth League to Thailand 
by forming the Provincial Committee of Udon Thani (Tinh Uy 
U-Don). In December 1929, he returned to Hong Kong to pre- 
side over the formation of a unified communist party in 
January or February 1930 (the date still remains unclear). Given 
the effectiveness of French repression inside Indochina, the geo- 
graphy of Comintern liaisons in southern China and thanks to 
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help from the CCP itself, the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP, Dang Cong San Viet Nam) was established in Hong Kong, 
highlighting the larger Asian context into which Vietnamese 
communism was born and the French repressive machine that 
kept it there. 
But what interests me most here is what Nguyen Ai Quoc did 
following the unification of the VCP,% renamed in late 1930 the 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) on Cornintern instructions. 
For during his trip to southern China, Quoc met with Western 
Comintern chiefs such as Hilaire Noulens and was named the 
chief of the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB), which was eventually 
relocated to Hong Kong too. Quoc was charged with building 
communism in all the Nanyang region-honed down by the 
Comintern to include French Indochina, Thailand, the Dutch 
Indies, British Malaya and Burma, and probably the Philip- 
pines. To this end, he returned to Hong Kong to form a sub- 
office of the FEB, to be known aptly as the Southern Bureau. 
This body may also have been home to the CCP's headquarters 
for administering the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan, 
Guangxi and Guangdong, highlighting again the degree to 
which revolutionary jurisdiction for southern China and the 
Nanyang region continued to overlap into the 1930s? 
The FEB had to be run by Asians familiar with the region, its 
languages and geography. While Quoc was not necessarily 
Moscow's first choice,40 he was particularly well suited for the 
Comintern's Nanyang job. He had the language skills, the major 
Asian contacts of the Dong Du and Youth League, the leading 
patriotic 6migr6 leaders in northeastern Siam (Dang Thuc Hua) 
and even in southern China (Ho Hoc Lam).41 He was also 
known within the CCP and FCP. Nguyen Ai Quoc's instruc- 
tions were clear: he was to place the Vietnamese Communist 
Party under the direction of the Comintern's Singapore office; 
transform the South Seas [Nanyang] Communist Party into the 
Malaya Communist Party; attach the Nanyang's Central Com- 
mittee in charge of South Seas' communist movements to the 
Singapore Section of the Comintern; and to create a Siamese 
Communist Party by combining Chinese communists attached 
to the Nanyang branch in Bangkok with their Vietnamese Youth 
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League counterparts in the northeast. These decisions were in 
line with Comintern directives calling for a party in each 
regional state, whether colonial or not.42 
Quoc disagreed with the Comintern's desire to attach the 
Vietnamese party to the SSCP Secretariat based in Singapore.@ 
He argued that Vietnam's proximity to China made it wiser to 
place the Vietnamese organization under the FEB in southern 
China, together with communist parties from China, Japan and 
Korea.44 Geographically, Quoc explained, Vietnam was more 
closely linked to southern China, given the long-standing 
maritime and land links connecting the two countries. In a 
letter to the Comintern, dated 18 February 1930, he stressed that 
northern Vietnam was propitiously positioned at the tip of a 
revolutionary thrust extending southwards from Russia across 
China to Tonkin? 
However, even if Quoc inclined towards southern China for 
building Vietnamese communism (with the CCP's and Comin- 
tern's presence in Shanghai and Hong Kong firmly in mind46), 
the Nanyang nature of his internationalist tasks ensured that his 
movements would have to be linked to Singapore. For this 
reason, Quoc was quick to add, 'I ask the Chinese C[ommunist] 
P[arty] [for] a letter of introduction so that we may send an 
Annamese comrade to work with Singa~ore. '~~ Given the level 
of Sino-Vietnamese co-operation in Canton, Quoc counted on 
the CCP's overseas organizations to execute the Comintern's 
directives in Southeast Asia. Some time in March 1930 he 
returned to Bangkok for the second time. He met with overseas 
Chinese communists first before moving inwards to Viet  kieu 
strongholds in northeastern Thailand.48 
The Sino- Vietnamese Origins of Thai Radicalism 
Quoc transformed the Youth League's Udon Provincial Com- 
mittee into the Northeastern Siamese Territorial Committee (Xu 
Uy Dong Bac Xiern).49 He explained to his followers the inter- 
national situation; the recent creation of the VCP in Hong Kong; 
and relayed the Comintern's desire to establish a Siamese 
Communist Party. He made it clear that the Comintern had 
issued instructions calling for the participation on the part of all 
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cadres in the proletarian revolution in whichever Asian state 
they might reside, regardless of ethnic distinctions. For this 
reason, he insisted, Vietnamese radicals in Thailand now had 
the responsibility of helping the Thai 'masses' to create a 
revolution in the 'spirit of international proletarianism'. Quoc 
called on his men to select appropriate members from the 
Youth League section to become communists and to foster the 
establishment of the 'Siamese' party, separate from the VCP. In 
another meeting, Quoc explained that Thailand was still a 
feudal country and a semi-colony. It had not reached the stage 
of a socialist revolution. It first had to pass through a demo- 
cratic period and then, with the help of the international com- 
munist movement, it would reach the stage of a socialist revo- 
lution. Vietnamese militants in Thailand now had to reorient 
their attention towards the Thai as part of a world r e v o l u t i ~ n . ~  
To my knowledge, this was the first time since the 17th cen- 
tury that Vietnamese immigrants living in Thailand had been 
asked to try to convert the non-Vietnamese majority to a uni- 
versalistic Western ideology. In fact, Nguyen Ai Quoc's trip to 
Thailand in 1930 on behalf of the Comintern marked the begin- 
ning of Vietnamese communist efforts to use their Vie t  kiezi 
patriotic networks to introduce and to spread communism to an 
ethnically non-Viet country. It coincided with a similar reorien- 
tation in the CCP's Nanyang organizations, especially in Malaya, 
where the internationalist line still coming from Shanghai 
continued to dominate until Mao Zedong's Long March re- 
oriented Chinese communism inwards towards Yanan and Li 
Lisan returned to Moscow. 
In April 1930, back in Bangkok, Nguyen Ai Quoc joined with 
CCP cadres of the South Seas Communist Party (see above) to 
form the Siamese Communist Party (SCP, Dang Cong San Xiem 
in Vietnamese). Vietnamese and Chinese ran its Central Com- 
mittee, including Quoc's Canton students Le Manh Trinh and 
Tran To Chan. Fu Ta Chang, a Chinese member of the CCP's 
Southern Bureau, helped Quoc jump-start Siamese radicalism,5' 
for at the outset the SCP was a remarkably un-Thai affair and a 
very Sino-Vietnamese import. Of the SCP's 325 party members, 
most were Chinese industrial and estate workers who were said 
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to be 'of weak quality', unable to carry out their tasks effec- 
tively. Ethnically, there were 55 Vietnamese and 20 Cantonese. 
The rest were Hainane~e .~~ This is hardly surprising given the 
Comintern's proletarian line and the large Chinese working 
class in Bangkok. In the northeast, where there was no real 
working class other than a very small number of overseas 
Chinese and Vietnamese coolies and construction workers, the 
SCP was run by Vietnamese from Viet kieu communities. 'As for 
authentic Siamese comrades', Hoang Van Hoan tells us, 'there 
weren't that many' (dong chi thuc su la nguoi Xiem thi khong co 
may). The best recruits in the northeast, he claims, came from 
the offspring of Thai-Viet mixed marriages.% Revealingly, 
Hoan says he spent most of his time translating Chinese 
revolutionary tracts. Or as a November 1932 article in a Party 
paper summed up the SCP's major flaw: 
Our party is called the Communist Party of Siam, but in truth 
our Party has only Chinese ... The basis by which we can 
change Siam comes down to a method by which we can bring 
Siamese into the Party. This is not a new problem. The same 
measure was discussed at our meeting last year . . . where we 
decided that the first step was for members to study Siamese 
in preparation for contacting Siamese. It was decided to seek 
results in six months, but from that time to the present it has 
been a year and not a single branch has announced progress.54 
Indigenizing communist parties in states in which the majority 
populations remained unreceptive to the communist message, 
or at least Sino-Vietnamese versions of it, would be a recurring 
problem in mainland Southeast Asia well into the postwar 
period.55 The matter was even more complicated given that the 
internationalist projects of these Chinese and Vietnamese mis- 
sionaries were simultaneously running up against emerging 
nationalist movements directed often against these two very 
ethnic groups, respectively. The Chinese encountered this pro- 
blem in Malaya in the early 1930s and late 1940s, just as the 
Vietnamese did in Laos and Cambodia at the same  juncture^.^^ 
But things got really complicated when Nguyen Ai Quoc, the 
good internationalist, had to explain away anti-Chinese Viet- 
namese nationalist riots in Haiphong in 1927 to the Comintern? 
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The Overland Vietnamese Origins of 
Lao tian Radicalism 
If the overseas Chinese had introduced communism to the 
Southeast Asian port cities of Thailand and Malaya, the over- 
land patterns of Vietnamese immigration to upper northeast 
Thailand led the Vietnamese to play the leading role in bringing 
radicalism to western Laotian urban centres. As in Thailand, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc presided over this transfer. In fact, during his 
first trip to Thailand in 1928-29, Quoc had ordered the expan- 
sion of the Youth League to Viet kieu communities concentrated 
in Laotian urban centres directly opposite his Thai bases. Quoc 
even made a brief trip to Laos in 1929 to evaluate the revo- 
lutionary potential there and to form liaisons with central Viet- 
nam.% Given that the Vietnamese constituted the majority of 
the urban population in Laos as well as its working class in the 
mines, on its road construction crews and in the Indochinese 
b~reaucracy ,~~  it is hardly surprising that the Youth League's 
Laotian graft occurred along strictly ethnic Viet lines. 
Returning to the Mekong in 1930, Quoc gave the personal 
order to transform the (few) Youth League organizations in 
Laos into communist cells (chi bo). According to Hoang Van 
Hoan, Quoc may well himself have formed the first 'Lao com- 
munist cell' (chi bo cong san Lao) in early 1930, separate from an 
Indochinese one, given that the ICP did not yet exist in early 
1930.M) In any case, Vietnamese communists would form a Lao- 
tian Territorial Committee (Xu Lly Ai-Lao) on 9 September 1934, 
linked to the one Quoc had created in Udon, another in central 
Vietnam and to the ICP's headquarters now transferred to 
Macao under the Comintern and possibly the CCP's super- 
vision. The tasks of this Laotian-based committee were to 
organize the Laotian section of the ICP (Dang bo) and to help 
rebuild the Annam section of the ICP following the French 
repression of 1930-31. As of 1934, though, Vietnamese com- 
munists had yet to recruit an ethnic Lao into their party appa- 
ratus. They would, however, convert two in 1935-36 (see 
below).61 The rest were all Vietnamese. 
Christopher E. Goscha 
If Chinese and Vietnamese shared the direction of the SCP 
between Bangkok (Hua qiao) and northeast Thailand (Viet kieu), 
Vietnamese radicals along the Mekong imported communism 
to Laos alone-not the native Lao or the Chinese. Why? First, 
the internal momentum of the Vietnamese revolutionary net- 
work outside Indochina, especially in northeast Thailand, had 
always been based on Viet kieu communities running from 
Bangkok to Nakhon Phanom-not on the ethnic Lao consti- 
tuting the majority there. And as noted, the Hua qiao population 
remained relatively small along the Mekong and in Laos.62 
Most were regional merchants anyway, with little interest in 
anti-bourgeois revolution. Second, coming from eastern Indo- 
china, young, mainly urban Vietnamese radicals making their 
way to Thailand had few, if any, links to the Lao or Khmer 
peasantries prior to 1945. Third, the urban nature of increasing 
Vietnamese immigration to western Laos in the 1920s and 1930s 
reinforced the stepping-stone nature of the Viet kieu pockets 
running both ways between northeastern Thailand and central 
Vietnamese  province^.^^ Fourth, for cultural and political 
reasons which we can only evoke in passing here, Thai, Lao and 
Khmer youths did not always share the early interest of their 
Vietnamese neighbours for radicalism and Catholicism. Fifth, 
by the early 20th century, as banditry and slave trading across 
the highlands dropped off under the French, this route crossing 
the Annamese Cordillera tended to move more and more Viet- 
namese west. However, there were relatively fewer Laotians 
going east to work with the Vietnamese, and thereby come into 
contact with the revolutionary ideas and agitation shaking 
eastern Indochinese towns, mines and plantations in the 1930s 
(see below). Lastly, following closely on the ancient path 
outlined above, the construction of Colonial Route no. 9 
actually increased Vietnamese immigration to the Mekong and 
provided more recruits for the ICP's Mekong  organization^.^^ 
Of course, mixed Viet-Lao marriages could have served as a 
conduit for bringing revolutionary-minded luuk khrung (me'tis) 
into the Vietnamese Youth League in the late 1920s. However, 
the patterns of predominantly male Vietnamese migration to 
Laos with the opening of Route 9 in the early 1920s would only 
20 Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 14 0 2000 
Vietnamese Revolutionaries and Communism in Southeast Asia 
start producing a few adult Lao-Viet me'tis revolutionaries in the 
mid-1940s (son of a Vietnamese bureaucrat, Kaysone Phom- 
vihan is one example).65 More often than not, Vietnamese inter- 
nationalists would recruit ethnic Lao and Khmer 'anticolonia- 
lists' inside French Indochina, from 'on high' inside the Univer- 
sity of Hanoi or the Indochinese bureaucracy (Souphanouvong 
is a nice demonstration) or from 'down below' thanks to Laotian 
truck drivers crossing the Truong Son (Nouhak Phoumsavan 
comes to mind), Vietnamese-Cambodian me'tis fishermen mov- 
ing up the Tonle Sap (Son Ngoc Minh is an example) or Cambo- 
dian prisoners serving time with Vietnamese militants at Poulo 
Condor (Pacheoun is a case in point). Rarely did this recruiting 
occur before 1945. 
The prewar dynamics of Vietnamese revolutionary immi- 
gration in Asia did create a number of postwar Vietnamese 
experts on Laos. By taking over long-standing patriotic Viet kieu 
communities in upper northeast Thailand, a generation of 
young Vietnamese radicals-perfectly fluent in Lao and at ease 
in Lao culture extending far into northeastern Thailand 
(Isan)-emerged within the most trusted circles of the ICP and 
within the very entourage of Nguyen Ai Quoc's Udon 
Thani/Canton classes. I am thinking of Nguyen Tai, Dao Viet 
Hung, Le Manh Trinh, Tran To Chan, Mai Van Quang, Hoang 
Van Hoan and Nguyen Cau Chinh. Most of these cadres would 
play key roles in building and running a Laotian revolutionary 
party, army and front from 1948. They did this from their 
prewar bases in upper northeast Thailand and upper central 
Vietnam (known better later as Lien Khu IV). This was even 
true before the Second World War. The evidence suggests that 
the first Lao communist, this enigmatic 'Khamseng', was born 
in Nakhon Phanom, recruited by Vietnamese communists in 
the Laotian mines of Phontiou and possibly taken by Hoang 
Van Hoan to China in 1935 under the name of 'Van'. There, 
Hoan left him with Le Thiet Hung for revolutionary training 
and possible dispatch to M o s ~ o w . ~  In Thailand, these early 
Asian networks also manifested themselves later in revolu- 
tionary ways. The son of the niece of Dang Thuc Hua, known 
by his Thai name 'Thung', allegedly 'became a Thai citizen and 
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some time in the early 1980s became deputy secretary or 
secretary general of the Thai communist party'.67 
My point is that by the mid-1930s, Sino-Vietnamese-filtered 
Western radicalism had extended itself from southern China 
(Canton) to northeastern Thailand (Udon Thani), to make its 
way into Indochina's Laotian backdoor by way of Viet kieu 
immigrant networks linked to central Vietnam. Given the geo- 
graphy of these peninsular movements, in Laos and northeast 
Thailand the early canalisation of communism was an ethni- 
cally Vietnamese operation. In Bangkok, it was shared with the 
overseas Chinese? These 'implantations' were urban-based 
with little contact with the indigenous masses concentrated in 
the countryside (see below). 
The Poverty of Early Cambodian Radicalism 
To the southeast, another young Vietnamese radical named 
Tran Van Giau hoped to use the Viet kieu concentrated in 
Phnom Penh and southeastern Cambodia to form a parallel ICP 
Cambodian Territorial Committee (Xu Uy Cao Mien). Giau had 
first attempted this via the Transbassac Committee, subordinate 
to his semi-independent Southern Indochinese Federal Com- 
mittee in 1934. Unlike his Nghe-Tinh counterparts, though, 
Giau had no bases among the Viet kieu in southeastern Thailand 
and chronic, internal dissension among southern Vietnamese 
communists may have diverted him from expanding his work 
up the Cambodian Mekong as his Asian-trained colleagues 
were doing across the Truong Son. Second, Giau was much 
more interested in organizing the workers in the cities than the 
peasants in the countryside; therefore, any interest he had in 
finding a 'Cambodian working class' had to focus, again, on the 
Viet kieu and Hua qiao majority proletariats in Phnom Penh or 
the Vietnamese coolies working the rubber plantations of 
eastern Cambodia. Third, the fact that Tran Van Giau, a young 
southerner trained in France and Moscow, was always in much 
closer contact with the French Communist Party's (FCP) Asian 
liaisons and agents hooked to Saigon would not have helped in 
Thailand, where the FCP had few, if any, links and Tran Van 
Giau was largely an unknown quantity to Quoc's Canton-Udon 
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graduates.@ Indeed, Giau's Whampoa- and Youth League- 
trained rival, Nguyen Van Tay (alias Nguyen Thanh Son), may 
have been the one dealing with Cambodia in the 1930s. Not 
without a parallel to Hoang Van Hoan's recruitment of 'Van', 
Nguyen Van Tay had first converted Son Ngoc Minh to the 
ICP's Cambodian cause in the 1930s. If Khamseng came from a 
Viet-Lao family in northeast Thailand, Son Ngoc Minh was a 
Viet-Khmer me'tis from the Cambodian minority of southern 
Vietnam, if not all Vietnamese. His real name was Pham Van 
Hua. 
Indeed, the absence of ICP bases among the Viet kieu opposite 
western Cambodia, along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand and 
up the Ton16 Sap is striking. Here one wonders whether Viet- 
namese revolutionaries ran up against stiff competition from 
their Catholic counterparts who, since the 17th century, had 
been firmly 'implanted' among Viet kieu communities running 
along the entire coast of the Gulf of Thailand from Rach Gia to 
Bangkok and straight up the Mekong River. Even in Laos, a 
French missionary warned of the competition priests would 
encounter in winning over converts among the poor Vietnam- 
ese corning to Laos: 
Since the end of September [1928], agitators have arrived from 
Bangkok and Annam in order to exploit the patriotic feelings 
and the poverty, since the Annamese [Vietnamese] presently 
in Laos have come because they have nothing at home [in 
Vietnam]. There is nothing simpler [for the communists] than 
to build up their hopes by promising a quick return home, the 
sharing of wealth, equality and happiness for all, once the 
French are e~pelled.~' 
This double evangelization among the Viet kieu was real. We 
know, thanks to his 1930 report to the Cornintern on the Viet 
kieu in Laos, that Nguyen Ai Quoc had lost 'over 1,000' Catholic 
supporters in Laos, when French priests threatened to refuse 
them communion (thong cong) if they joined Quoc's budding 
communist congregations.71 But our Catholic missionary had to 
admit that it was 'a real pain to have communist Christians' 
among his followers. The converse would be true, too. Interest- 
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ingly, Nguyen Ai Quoc never went to the Thai-Cambodian 
border; he went further into the Nanyang. 
No Chi Minh and the 'Creation' of the 
Malaya Communist Party 
After having formed the VCP in Hong Kong in early 1930, a 
'Lao communist cell' from Nakhon Phanom shortly thereafter, 
and the Siamese Communist Party in Bangkok in April 1930, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc took a boat to Singapore, where he attended, 
on behalf of the FEB, the Third Representative Conference of 
the South Seas Communist Party (see above) held in late April 
or early May 1930. Under Quoc's direction, the South Seas 
Communist Party was dismantled, as ordered by the Comin- 
tern, and rebaptized as a separate Malaya Communist Party 
(MCP). The MCP was also put in charge of fellow communist 
parties in Siam, British North Borneo and the Netherlands East 
Indies until the latter could stand on their own feet under the 
direction of the Far Eastern Bureau. 'The whole aim of this 
reorganization [of Nanyang communism]', a Special Branch 
report said, 'was to free the South Seas movement from the 
direct "central" control which was making it a purely Chinese 
movement'. Under the FEB, 'it was hoped that each individual 
state would progress along racial lines'. According to the 
Special Branch, the Comintern's idea in creating the FEB was to 
establish more direct contact with each regional country rather 
than relying entirely on the CCP's Nanyang networks running 
from Shanghai to Singapore, 'which hitherto had been the main 
instrument in the dissemination of communism in Eastern 
Colonial countries' (see a b ~ v e ) . ~  Relying on captured SSCP 
archival documents, the British reported that the Comintern's 
failure to promote indigenous communism via CCP channels 
was one of the main reasons for the dispatch of Serge Lefranc 
(alias Ducroux) and the appropriation of 100,000 Straits dollars 
to reorganize the Nnnyang parties 'along racial  line^'.^ In his 
address to the 3rd Representative Conference of the SSCP, Quoc 
pointed out to his Chinese listeners the need to study the Malay 
language and to enlist ethnic Malay recruits in the party, all the 
more so since there were no Malay or Indians present at Quoc's 
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'nationalist' transformation of the SSCP into the MCP for the 
'internationalist cause'.j4 
The irony of all this could not have been lost on Quoc. 
Nowhere is this better seen than in the selection of the secretary 
general of the MCP. For if Nguyen Ai Quoc had lamented 
Chinese domination of Malay radicalism in 1930, chronic 
organizational and structural problems apparently left local 
communists with no choice but to allow an ethnic Vietnamese 
or Minh Huong, known by the pseudonym of 'Lai Teck', to take 
over the MCP. 
Lai Teck had been a Comintern liaison chief in Hong Kong 
before arriving in Malaya ir? 1933 or 1?34 and becoming the 
secretary general of the MCP in 1938. He held this office until 
1947.% In August 1945, British military intelligence sources con- 
firmed that Lai Teck, known secretly as 'Mr Wright' to the 
Allies during the war, was the former secretary general of the 
MCP prior to the Second World War and was still a member of 
the Central Committee after the war. The British identified him 
as an ethnic Vietnamese, as well as the MCP's 'most secret and 
revered personality. . . . He is a shrewd and clever man, but no 
fanatic'.j6 Lai Teck was apparently an informer passed by the 
French Siirete' to the British Special Branch in 1934 or 1935. In 
1947, he was de-masked and killed. 
In view of our discussion so far, there was clearly a logic to 
this choice. Not only had the Vietnamese played the key role in 
forming their own party in Hong Kong in early 1930, but they 
had also helped create the SCP, a 'Lao communist cell', the MCP 
and would later form the Cambodian and Laotian Communist 
Parties. And even more important than this Sino-Vietnamese 
revolutionary intersection within the MCP in Singapore was the 
ability of so many Vietnamese communists to circulate in 
southern Chinese revolutionary networks, especially in Canton, 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The problem was that delinking the early importation of 
mainland communism from its overseas Chinese and overland 
Vietnamese regional structures was much easier said than 
done. This was less because of ideological 'under-development' 
or 'weak nationalism' in the lands west of the Annamese Cordil- 
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lera than the long-standing mechanics of Sino-Vietnamese im- 
migration across the peninsula; the indispensable, transnational 
role of Hua qiao and Viet kieu revolutionaries in the early (inter- 
nationalist) 'stock' of the Comintern's (national) 'grafts' in the 
Nanyang; and their related faith in international communist sal- 
vation. This, in turn, might be analysed in terms of the early 
Chinese and Vietnamese position as the majority working clas- 
ses in the urban centres of the mainland cities during the period 
of colonial modernization, especially in Laos and CambodiaIn 
whereas the indigenous majority populations remained over- 
whelmingly concentrated in the countryside before 1945. There 
was thus little chance for these two currents to converge at the 
outset. Given the proletarian shift in the internationalist line in 
the late 1920s, the Comintern obviously had little choice but to 
turn to existing Vietnamese and Chinese majority working clas- 
ses and ancient patterns of Sino-Vietnamese immigration to 
spread communism into peninsular Southeast Asian urban 
centres. 
Vietnam, however, was in a unique position in these Nanyang 
revolutionary movements; for it was both an exporter of the 
Viet kieu workers and bureaucrats vital to the French colonial 
modernization of Laos and Cambodia in western Indochina and 
home itself to a large Hua qiao 'national minority' that was itself 
playing an important (and badly under-studied) modernizing 
role in colonial Vietnam.78 Given the Comintern's focus on 
urban workers, this may explain why Nguyen Ai Quoc repor- 
ted to the FEB in early 1931 that of the 1,740 members of the 
ICP, there were 190 Chinese (11 per cent), and that of the 1,370 
union workers there were 300 Chinese (18 per cent). Two 
Central Committee positions in the ICP had been reserved for 
Hua qiao communists in Ind~china.~' If Vietnamese held impor- 
tant leadership positions in the Thai, Cambodian and Lao party 
sections, the regional nature of Hua qiao immigration in the 
Nanyang ensured that Chinese immigrant communists helped 
build communism in Vietnam, especially in the south where 
Chinese immigration had historically been concentrated. Two 
Chinese communists, Lam Lap Dao and A Duyen, held ranking 
positions in the Central Committee of the ICP during its shift to 
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southern Vietnam after the break between communists and 
nationalists in southern China in the late 1920s and the French 
repression of Vietnamese revolutionaries in upper Vietnam 
from 1930. This Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary link was such 
that a dozen or so Hua qiao communists joined in the failed ICP 
Nam Ky uprising in 1940. Most of them were killed or arrested; 
some escaped to Thailand.80 But just as Vietnamese revolution- 
aries participated in the CCP's uprisings in Canton and Shang- 
hai in 1927, so too these Chinese saw no nationalist contradic- 
tion in helping out against French colonialism in 1940 in 
southern Vietnam. 
Yet viewed from a wider regional perspective, we might also 
note that there were no Lao revolutionary intellectuals crossing 
the Ai-Lao pass in 1930-31 to help out Vietnamese communists 
during the Yen Bay or Soviet Nghe-Tinh 'uprisings'. Nor did 
the ethnic Khmer 'revolutionaries' in southern Vietnam pick up 
arms during the Nam ky uprising in 1940. Indeed, Sino-Viet- 
namese success in evangelizing communism across the region 
remained weak west of the Annamese Cordillera. In September 
1932, the MCP Central Committee admitted that it had 'not 
been able to organize other races and our activities have been 
confined to a section of the Chinese people'. As of 1934,90 per 
cent of the MCP was Hainanese." The Vietnamese importation 
of radicalism to Laos was running up against a similar form of 
indigenous disinterest as the Chinese in Malaya. Frustrated, a 
Vietnamese cadre conceded in 1934 that communism in Laos 
was 'nothing other than a sub-section of the Vietnamese Com- 
munist Party'.82 Two Thai analysts de gauche have even gone so 
far as to say that the Communist Party of Thailand 'was con- 
ceived from the womb of the CCP in 1942', the official national 
birthday of Thai communism? And if Western observers like to 
stress the 'French revolutionary connection' of Khmer intel- 
lectuals like Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) and Ieng Sary, it is worth recal- 
ling that the no. 2 in Les Khmers rouges, Nuon Chea, was a Sino- 
Cambodian from Battambang who had been 'formed' in Bang- 
kok and was introduced to 'Asian radicalism' via the Commu- 
nist Party of Thailand, itself created in 1930 by the ICP and the 
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CCP revolutionary missionaries. Early communism in penin- 
sular Southeast Asia was a remarkably Sino-Vietnamese affair. 
Conclusion: Thinking about the 
'Why' and Factoring in 'Culture' 
Again, this does not mean that Lao and Khmer 'intellectuals' 
were somehow less 'anti-colonialist', 'poor nationalists' or 
'under-revolutionary'. However disappointing the absence of 
'Cantons' or 'Yen Bays' in Laotian and Cambodian historio- 
graphy may be for some,s4 it might be more useful from a 
historical and methodological point of view to ask whether Lao 
and Khmer (and Malayan?) 'revolutionary' movements were 
flowing in other networks, with different geographies and 
separate goals. Moreover, it is not at all sure that Lao and 
Khmer 'intellectuals' remained inert during the colonial period, 
just waiting to be 'liberated' by the 'civilizing missions' of the 
Vietnamese, the Chinese, or even the French and the Thais for 
that matter. It all depends on where one looks. After all, during 
the colonial period, hundreds if not thousands of Lao and 
Khmer Theravada monks preferred to keep crossing that less 
than impermeable western Indochinese border in order to 
travel to Thailand. There they perfected their religious studies 
in scores of Thai Pagoda schools or entered into centres of 
higher learning for Pali and Theravada studies. It was largely 
because of the cont inued  geo-cultural and religious pull of 
Thailand over 'western Indochina' and its Theravada minds 
that the French had to form their own Buddhist institutes in 
Laos and C a m b ~ d i a . ~ ~  In this light, rather than forcing the 
Buddhist intellectual 'agitation' in Cambodia in the early 1940s 
or the 'uprisings' in southern Laos in 1936 to fit French, Russian, 
Western or Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary models of what is to 
come in the future,% we might want to ask how it was geo- 
graphically, historically and culturally different. The teleologies 
of 'French colonial' and 'Vietnamese communist' historio- 
graphies of Indochina should not prevent us from picking up 
on deeper and wider historical  connection^.^^ 
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While I certainly admit that Euro-Asian police repression most 
certainly complicated the Comintern's internationalist success 
rate before the Second World War, these internal Vietnamese 
and Chinese documents reveal nevertheless that local cultural 
factors will also have to be taken into consideration in studies of 
the limitations of the Sino-Vietnamese diffusion of communism 
to the lands west of the Annamese Cordillera. Indeed, judging 
from the preponderant role played by the Chinese and 
Vietnamese in the early entry of communism to peninsular 
Southeast Asia, future research might explore in greater detail 
why communism failed to take form among the indigenous 
populations and elites of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaya 
before the Second World War and, yes, even thereafter.88 
Again, I am not saying that one had to be Confucian to be 
communist. Nor am I denying any Lao or Khmer the right to 
become a revolutionary or a communist or anything else they 
want to be. I am, however, suggesting that rather than analy- 
sing 'Asian' communists and communisms as if they are all one 
and the same, it might be worthwhile to think about how they 
differed. And if we should be careful not to force the link be- 
tween Confucianism and communism in studying Vietnamese 
radicalism, we might also think twice about accepting uncriti- 
cally the view that Cambodians and Laotians adopted Western 
radicalism in the same ways as the Vietnamese, just because 
Cambodian or Laotian 'parties' were eventually formed, be- 
cause they all shared an oppressive 'Indochinese' colonial past, 
fought the French and American 'imperialists' or studied a little 
Marxism in France. It was surely more complicated than that 
once things had to work themselves out on the ground.89 After 
all, even after forming 'proto-Communist' parties for Laos and 
Cambodia in 1950-51, Indochinese communism remained an 
undeniably ethnic Vietnamese affair. In 1951, for example, Viet- 
namese communists conceded that ethnic Khmers constituted 
only 8.4 per cent of the Cambodian 'party' and the Laotians 
only made up 3.8 per cent of the Lao section.%Did Cambodians 
and Laotians -revolutionaries or not-truly, or at least always, 
conceive the ideas of power, revolution, nationalism, colonial- 
ism and communism in the same ways as Vietnamese and 
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Chinese intellectual revolutionaries, let alone their Western 
counterparts? Perhaps notSg1 
Methodologically, we might get at these complex questions 
by placing them within a wider regional perspective, such as 
the one outlined above, and by focusing on the people and the 
routes by which communism flowed into the peninsula. Such a 
geographically grounded debut might then better guide us in 
the exploration of the complicated cultural world(s) these Sino- 
Vietnamese missionaries of revolution encountered when they 
moved into the western half of peninsular 'Indochina', especial- 
ly the Theravada lands located hardly 150 kilometres west of 
Hue. By combining the how and the why in this way we might 
grasp a little better the frustration of a ranking Vietnamese 
communist cadre charged with creating a Cambodian revolu- 
tionary party in 1950. In his mind, the major threat to the 
'Cambodian Revolution' (Cach mang Cao-Mien) in 1950 came less 
from French imperialism than from a recurrent absence of 
Cambodian interest in Sino-Vietnamese-inspired revolution. 
Echoing prewar reports of failed conversions in Laos and 
Malaya, this ranking Vietnamese cadre in the field did not 
mince his words in 1950: 
The Cambodian revolution must be the work of the Cambo- 
dians. If the Cambodians don't wake up, if their cadres don't 
know how to work, then it doesn't matter how many millions 
of [Vietnamese] cadres or thousands of tons of weapons and 
money we send them, it still won't do anything to help the 
Cambodian revolution.92 
Indeed, it was from this point in time (and not 1945) that 
Vietnamese communists accelerated their efforts to propagate 
(truyen ba) communism among the indigenous peoples of Laos 
and Cambodia. Frustrated, Vietnamese 'cadres' had to turn to 
recruiting monks, to incorporating Buddhist icons and symbols 
into their propaganda and even to taking up the religious garb 
in a bid to convert the masses more effectively. Like French and 
Vietnamese Catholic missionaries long before them, the results 
were very limited.% But this was not just the case for these 
Vietnamese modernists; it was also true for those 'Western' 
Khmer intellectuals returning from France at this same conjunc- 
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ture, determined to remake Cambodian society even more radi- 
cally than the Vietnamese. Indeed, things got ;eally nasty when 
these French-trained Khmer intellectuals tried to uproot Cam- 
bodian communism from its Vietnamese networks along pro- 
foundly national lines? to remould peasant and Buddhist 
Cambodia in revolutionary ways not without echoes in an 
Angkorian past; and all this as Sino-Vietnamese international- 
ism came tumbling down from on high. 
Admittedly, these matters, above all the why, deserve much 
more serious research than this. In this paper, I have tried to 
outline one part of a methodologically complicated question. In 
dealing with the how, I have suggested the possible merits of a 
regional approach running over a longer span of time than we 
are normally accustomed to; one that brings geography into the 
picture, allows for cultural and demographical factors, under- 
scores possible temporal synchronisms and gets us beyond the 
straitjacket of fiercely nationalist and colonial historiographies 
without necessarily sacrificing the e've'ne~nent.~~ I have also tried 
to suggest the possible merits of factoring Asian variables into 
our analytical framework of communism in terms of how they 
worked themselves out on the ground and not just in revo- 
lutionary heads. The West was certainly important; but we 
would have an incomplete picture if we did not consider how 
these ideas were diffused geographically, filtered socially and 
adapted culturally as they moved their way through Asia. My 
aim is not to downgrade Western theories or advocate cultural 
relativism, let alone push 'Asian values' in these days of 
(troubled) Asian regional identity; but I think that this part of 
the world is just too complicated to leave the Asian regional 
connections out. Vietnamese communism, like its Catholic pre- 
decessor, is no exception. What remains to be examined now is 
how the 'evangelical message' was adopted or rejected by the 
local people on the ground and why. 
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